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Abstract
In this article we develop a dynamic model where an endogenous evolution of trust
impacts a politician’s choice for bribe-taking and tax re-distribution. The politician ob-
tains utility from net income that comes from his wage income, tax embezzlements and
bribe-taking, and he also has incentives for tax re-distribution. The higher the tax em-
bezzlements and the more bribes the politician takes the lower his citizens’ trust and the
less likely will he be re-elected. We support the evolution of trust with an econometric
investigation.
We analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions, and find that withholding taxes
and taking bribes may be complements or substitutes for a politician, depending on the
politician’s incentives for tax re-distribution. Without these incentives, tax embezzlement
and bribe taking are necessarily substitutes. With sufficiently strong incentives, we find
re-distribution and bribe-taking may become complements. Complements implies that
the politician, at least partly, increases bribe-taking because this allows him to increase
re-distribution, which aids his additional motives for tax re-distribution.
Based on comparative statics at steady state we also find that the higher the politician’s
wage the lower the bribe-taking and the higher the trust; stronger social capital leads to
less bribe-taking and higher levels of trust; improvements in electoral accountability induce
a decrease in bribing while trust increases.
Keywords: trust; corruption; political stability; bribe; dynamic model.
JEL Classification: D73; H11; E10; K42.
1IPAG Business School, 184 bd Saint-Germain, 75006 Paris; and Department of Economics, Ecole Poly-
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1 Introduction
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon that penetrates most societies. For example, over
80 percent of firms in Uganda report that they need to pay bribes (Svensson [52]). This is
only topped by Burundi, where around 90 percent of all companies suggest that bribing is a
standard practice (Dobson [25]). In a field experiment in Indonesia, Olken [47] found that
roughly a third of the money for road projects had been stolen. Di Tella and Schargrodsky
[23] concluded that measures to diminish corruption led to a substantial reduction in prices
at hospitals in Buenos Aires.1 Having corrupt officials is, generally, not in the interest of
voters, yet we know that some corrupt regimes can actually stay in power over an extended
period of time while others cannot. Thus, one would imagine that voters trade off several
variables when it comes to considering whether a corrupt politician should be re-elected or
not. The focus in this article is to study the incentives for a corrupt politician to influence
those variables.
When one looks at the correlation between perceived corruption and trust in politicians
in a cross-section of countries,2 then one finds a significant negative correlation between the
two (Figure 1). One also finds a strong negative correlation between corruption and political
stability (Figure 2) but a positive correlation between trust and political stability (Figure 3).
The purpose of this article is to present a model that is able to explain the aforementioned
correlation from a politician’s perspective. The claim forwarded and studied in this article
is that leaders know that they require their citizens’ trust in order to continue their political
career. This trust is, however, evolving endogenously. We suggest that politicians reduce the
trust that their citizens have in them when increasing their bribe-taking, but may increase
trust via a higher level of re-distribution from taxes. Corruption, in our setting, thus consists
of bribe-taking and money withdrawn from taxes.3 In our model, corruption affects trust
negatively and the amount of trust feeds back in the probability of being overthrown, either
1Many further examples are found in the book by William Easterly The Elusive Quest for Growth [26] and
the Transparency International Global Corruption Reports.
2Perceived corruption and political stability are taken from the Governance Indicators by Kaufmann et al.
[39], while trust is taken from the Eurobarometer 71.1.
3Thus, the type of corruption that we consider here is not efficient corruption as defined in Aidt [2], but
we study official corruption as defined in Nye [46]. Official corruption is a “behavior which deviates from the
formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding ... pecuniary or status gains” (Nye, [46], p.419).
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by a democratic vote or by force. Thus, the political instability in this article should be
understood as the endogenous probability of being ‘relieved’ from office. We then study
how a politician trades off bribe-taking and re-distribution‘, and therefore trust, with the
probability of staying in office.
Our main findings are as follows. Withholding taxes and taking bribes may be comple-
ments or substitutes for a politician, depending on the politician’s social incentives4 for tax
re-distribution. If the politician has negligible social incentives, then tax embezzlement and
bribe taking are necessarily substitutes. In this case, a reduction in trust from higher bribe-
taking needs to be optimally offset by an increase in trust from a larger re-distribution. The
politician chooses the mix of tax embezzlement and bribe-taking that leads to his desired
level of trust, which affects his probability of being re-elected. In case social incentives are
strong drivers of the politician’s actions, then re-distribution and bribe-taking may become
complements. Complements imply that the politician, at least partly, increases bribe-taking
because this allows him to increase re-distribution which aids his social motives. One would,
in practice, expect tax re-distribution and bribe-taking to be substitutes.
We find that the higher a politician’s income the lower the bribe-taking and the higher the
steady state trust. Thus, assuming that a politician’s income is proportional to his citizen’s
income, then different GDP levels can be an underlying factor explaining the cross-country
correlations in Figures 1 - 3. This is in line with Billger and Goel [14], who conclude that
richer countries have consistently lower levels of corruption. Indeed, though their empirical
results only suggest something about correlation instead of causality, our analytical model
presents a possible causal channel. Our results are also in line with Besley [12], who relates a
politician’s pay and performance. His main findings are that better performance goes along
with higher pay.
Our next result is that stronger social capital leads to a lower level of a politician’s bribe-
taking and a higher level of steady state trust. This corresponds to the line of literature
starting with Putnam [49] and followed up in La Porta et al. [40]. They find that social
capital is positively related to good economic outcomes across countries. Similar results have
4We call these social incentives, but they could be moral ones, altruistic ones or even egoistic ones, in case
e.g. the taxes re-distribute increase a public good from which the politician benefits.
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been obtained in Fukuyama [31], Alesina and Glaeser [3], Algan and Cahuc [7] as well as
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales [37], [38].
Finally, we show that improvements in electoral accountability induce a decrease in bribing
while steady state trust increases with improvements in electoral accountability. Intuitively,
the stronger the impact of trust on the probability of staying in office, the higher are a
politician’s incentive to improve trust and thereby increase the probability of staying in office.
We, therefore, reveal a possible relationship between media and informational problems in
elections. These links have been shown empirically in various studies. For example, Djankov
et al. [24] find a significant correlation between media ownership and election outcomes.
Whoever owns the press may significantly alter election outcomes. Similarly, Stro¨mberg [51]
shows how the media can affect the re-distribution of taxes (through the New Deal stimulus),
while Brunetti and Weder [17] conclude that a free press may reduce corruption. In a slightly
different line of research, Ferejohn [28] and Chowdhury [20] have shown that democracy has
a significant impact on corruption through electoral accountability. Similar results are in
Billger and Goel [14], who conclude that democracy may reduce corruption levels for the very
corrupt regimes but at diminishing rates.
Research on political instability and economic or social factors is now accumulating. The
relationship between political instability and growth derives from Grossman’s [36] analysis
of insurrection. In countries where rulers are relatively weak, i.e. more easily overthrown,
the probability of revolutions is higher and the citizens have higher incentives to engage in
revolutionary activities. Barro [10] finds that measures of political unrest, such as the number
of assassinations and the occurrence of revolutions and coups, significantly affect the cross-
sectional growth rates. A similar result is found in Alesina et al. [5]. In contrast to this,
Campos and Nugent [18] do not find a causal effect from political instability to economic
growth (only a marginally significant one for the sub-Sahara African subsample). Alesina
and Tabellini [6] examine the effect of political uncertainty on investment and capital flight.
Other studies on corruption include Uslaner [54], who regresses trust on corruption and finds
a negative correlation; openness and corruption (Ades and Di Tella [1], Treisman [53], Baksi
et al. [8]); coordinated rent-seeking behavior and corruption (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio
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[16]); corruption and economic growth (Mauro [42]).
The article is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe our view of the evolution
of trust that a politician holds in society. We substantiate the assumptions by an empirical
analysis based on the World Value Survey dataset. We also describe how a politician’s is
likely to estimate the probability of being voted out of office. Section 3 introduces the model
setup, followed by an analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions. We then discuss
the dynamics of the model. In section 4 we use the model to explain several results that
have, so far, only been shown empirically without a theoretical foundation. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Trust and political stability
In this section we provide our basic assumptions on the evolution of trust in politicians, the
implications for political stability, and the underlying empirical evidence.
2.1 Modeling the evolution of trust
Let us define X > 0 as the constant and exogenously given amount of taxes that a politician
obtains, and Rt ≥ 0 as the amount that he re-distributes. We allow for Rt > X, which
implies that the politician may re-distribute own funds. The politician may also take bribes,
Bt. The amount of trust, denoted by Tt, that a politician holds is then an increasing function
of the amount that he re-distributes relative to the taxes that he receives, where we denote
the voters’ perception of relative re-distribution by G(Rt − X). Trust is also non-linearly
decreasing in the bribes that he takes, modeled through function F (Bt).
Assumption 1 G : R→ R, and ∃Rˆ > 0, such that G(Rt−X) > 0, ∀Rt > Rˆ and G(Rt−X) ≤
0, ∀Rt ≤ Rˆ. GR > 0, GRR < 0. F : R+ → R+, F (0) = 0, FB > 0, FBB > 0.
We characterize changes in trust over time by the equation
dTt
dt
= G(Rt −X)− F (Bt)− δTt,
6
with Tt ∈ [0,∞), ∀t.
The more bribes a politician takes the lower will be the trust that he receives from his
voters. Bribes, therefore, act as a loss of reputation. It is reasonable to assume that more
bribe-taking implies an increasing loss of trust. Small levels of bribes might be more easily
unnoticed or tolerated by the voters, whereas large levels of bribes should lead to significant
decreases in trust.5 If the politician re-distributes too few taxes to his voters, then this
decreases their trust in him, and after a certain amount of re-distribution this increases
the trust he obtains. The value of Rˆ represents the level of re-distribution at which voters
believe that their taxes have been used efficiently. The value of X itself might include money
from taxes, development aid and other official sources. It is reasonable to assume that for a
sufficiently large amount of bribe-taking it becomes more and more difficult to compensate
this behavior with redistribution up to the point where increases in bribes reduce overall
trust again. Total corruption in this model is then the amount of bribes plus the amount
of taxes withheld.6 We also allow for Rt > X, which implies that a politician would pay
re-distribution from his own income.7 Finally, we suggest that trust depreciates over time.
Intuitively, voters are assumed to forget the potentially good deeds of a politician over time.
2.2 Modeling political stability
Our assumptions concerning the endogenous political stability are as follows. At date τ > 0
the politician will have lost a sufficient amount of his voters’ trust and will therefore be
stripped of his position. He faces uncertainty over the exact time at which this may occur,
but knows that the timing of this event is also depending on the trust that his voters hold
in him. We assume that the politician uses a Poisson function to describe the evolution of
uncertainty. The probability of being voted out of office8 at date τ is therefore equal to the
5Obviously, a politician’s power to take bribes depends on the governmental structure. Highly vertical
structures can imply difficulties to implement certain forms of bribery that are otherwise more easily realized
in more horizontal structures, see e.g. Gerring and Thacker [32] and the discussion in Bardhan [9]. The shape
of function F (B) can accommodate this issue.
6This is related to the argument in Mauro [43], who shows the existence of a negative correlation between
perceived corruption and government expenditure.
7For example, politicians sometimes finance their own election campaigns.
8The reader might be inclined to feel that this model only applies to forceful removal from office in non-
democratic governments since we assume potentially unlimited terms in office and an uncertain timing of
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cumulative distribution function Fτ = P (s ≤ τ) = 1−∆τ , where ∆τ is the survival function,
which is the cumulative distribution function of not having been ‘relieved’ from office until
time τ . Thus, ∆τ = exp{−
∫ τ
0 psds}, where ps = lim↓0
(∆τ−∆τ+
∆τ
)
, which is the instantaneous
probability of being voted out of office at each point in time. Based on the previous discussion
and empirical analysis, we perceive this probability to be endogenously determined by trust.
Thus, p(Tt) represents the probability of being voted out of office which decreases with the
amount of trust that voters have in their politician. The following assumptions clarify the
shape of this probability function.
Assumption 2 We assume that p : R+ → R++, limT→∞ p(Tt) = pˆ > 0, pT < 0, pTT > 0,
limT→0 p(T ) =∞.
We take pˆ to be the minimum level of p(Tt) which suggests that there always exists a positive
probability of being voted out of office, independently of the level of trust. The last condition
limT→0 p(T ) =∞ implies that without trust the politician will be immediately evicted from
office.
Assumption 3 We assume 2pT (Tt)p(Tt) >
pTT (Tt)
pT (Tt)
and limT→0 p(T )
p(T )+δ
pT (T )
< 0.
These two conditions constrain the functional forms for p(Tt) that may be considered here.
They are technical conditions where the first condition basically requires that, for increasing
Tt, the ratio between marginal changes in p and the deviation of p from zero should be
increasing. The second condition requires that limT→0 pT (T ) should not go to infinity too
quickly.9
2.3 The underlying empirical links
With an empirical investigation we back up our assumptions on the evolution of trust and
the interplay between corruption, redistribution and trust. Table 2 shows empirical results
from the 1994-1999 wave of the World Value Survey (WVS) with 43,893 individuals in a
elections. However, history has shown that e.g. elections have been antedated based on votes of no confidence,
while US senators have unlimited terms as do many local governors in democratic countries. However, as a
referee rightly pointed out, the model ignores potential legal accountability for crimes. We assume this away
for simplicity.
9A function that satisfies this assumption and the previous one is, for example, p(Tt) = pˆ + 1/Tt.
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cross-section of 44 countries. We have a minimum of 324 individuals in Dominican Republic,
and a maximum of 1,878 replies in South Africa. We run a probit model with clustered (by
countries) standard errors across all regressions. We report the marginal effects, i.e. the
change in the probability for a change in the independent variables X, with the vector of
coefficients β. Our basic model is
Pr(confidence = 1|X) = F (X′β).
Confidence is the dependent variable and derives from the question “How much confidence
do you have in the government?”. The possible answers range from 1=(a great deal) to
4=(none at all). We recoded this variable as a dummy, denoting (1 and 2)=1 and (3 and 4)=0.
Confidence thus works as a subjective measure of trust in the government. The WVS includes
a question on bribing, where respondents are asked about their belief as to “How widespread
do you think bribe-taking and corruption is in this country?”. The possible answers range
from 1=(almost none) to 4=(almost all). We recode the variable as a dummy variable, dubbed
corrupt, that takes the value of 1 for (3 and 4) and 0 for (1 and 2). Thus, someone believing
that most or all public officials are corrupt scores a 1. Since there is no direct question about
re-distribution policies in the WVS we proxy redistribution by several variables. We take
the amount of savings (variable savings) and financial satisfaction (variable finasatis). The
variable savings is derived from the question: “During the past year, did your family save
money (=1), just get by (=2), spent some savings and borrowed money (=3), spent savings
and borrowed money (=4).” We constructed a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in case
the family had savings or just got by, and 0 if the family had to borrow money. The variable
finasatis comes from the question: “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your
household?” It ranges from dissatisfied (=1) to satisfied (=10). We recoded this as a dummy
taking the value of 0 for 1-5 and 1 for 6-10. Therefore, respondents that are satisfied will
score a 1, others a 0. Our intuition is that countries with stronger social policies including
better re-distribution should see more people having savings and a certain degree of financial
satisfaction. We also include two more indirect proxies. One we dub social, which is based
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on the question whether one believes that the “...country is run by a few big interests looking
out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?”. It takes the value of
0 if the respondent believes that the country is run by few big interests, while it takes the
value 1 if she believes that it is run for all people. Finally, the variable helpful derives from
the question whether the “government is doing for people in poverty in this country about
the right amount, too much, or too little”. We gave a 1 to those that answered ‘too much’
and those that answered ‘about the right amount’, and a 0 to those that answered ‘too little’.
As controls we include the educational attainment (dummies edu2 -edu8 ), where the bench-
mark edu1 is ‘not completed elementary education’, while edu8 is ‘university with degree’;
whether one discusses politics or not (discuss), with 1 denoting a regular discussion of policy
matters while 0 denotes never; sex, with 0 denoting male and 1 female; age; marital status,
where 0 denotes single and 1 married; attendance of religious meetings (religious), with 0
implying seldomly and 1 denoting regularly; and whether one is a party member, where party
members receive a 1 and non-members a 0. The summary statistic of these variables is given
in Table 1.
> Table 1 approximately here <
The results of this empirical investigation are as follows. Throughout regressions (1) to
(4) we see that our variables of interest, namely corrup and our proxies for re-distribution,
namely savings, finasatis, social and helpful are robust and statistically significant across
all specifications. They also enter the regression with the expected signs. In model (1) we
find that someone who believes that politicians are corrupt also has a 4.19% lower trust in
politicians compared to someone who does not believe that politicians are corrupt. Model (2)
controls for country-specific effects with country dummies, and we see that this strengthens
the relationship between corruption and trust even further, to -11% instead of -4.19%. On
average, individuals who believe that their government is corrupt, therefore, also have lower
levels of confidence, or trust, in their government.
> Table 2 approximately here <
People that were able to save and are satisfied with their financial situation also hold a higher
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level of trust in their government (at maximum 3% for either) compared to those that are not.
The variables social and helpful have the strongest correlation with trust, where governments
obtain a 24% higher level of trust if their voters believe that the politicians run the country
for the people. In addition, individuals hold a 10% higher level of trust in their government
in case they also believe that their government is doing sufficiently much against poverty in
their country. The empirical results we presented here basically show that individuals’ trust
in their government in robustly and statistically significantly correlated with their subjective
views on corruption and redistribution policies.
When adding controls, the previous results are still robust. We find that more highly
educated people have lower levels of trust in politicians, while those who discuss political
matters hold higher levels of trust and so do those that are party members. Sex does not have
a robust impact on trust in politicians while those that regularly attend religious meetings
hold a higher trust.
The existing literature further supports our results which provide the foundation for our
modeling choices. Bjørnskov [15] and Alesina and La Ferrara [4] show that income inequality
affects the extent of trust in society negatively. One would thus expect that good social re-
distribution policies reduce income inequalities and thereby increase trust. Similarly, more
corruption, lower efficiency of the judiciary and a worse bureaucratic quality all reduce trust
in people (La Porta et al. [40]).
3 The control problem
Our intention here is to explore possible relations between trust, corruption, income and
redistributive policies. For this we build a dynamic model which is able to reveal some of the
mechanics that may underlie those variables in question.
We start from the presumption that there exists a politician who obtains a constant
stream of taxes X > 0, a constant stream of wages Y > 0, and may choose the amount
Rt that he wants to re-distribute to his voters, as well as the amount of bribes Bt that he
wants to take. Thus, the politician maximizes his utility from both net income, given by
11
Zt = X + Y − Rt + Bt > 0, and his social motives for re-distribution of taxes, while at the
same time taking into account the feedback effects on trust, and thus the probability of being
voted out of office. Bribes here are for simplicity denoted in monetary terms, though may
take any other form. Redistribution Rt in the felicity function suggests that the politician is,
at least to some extent, benevolent and obtains own felicity from acting socially good. This
is supported in an article from Vardis Fisher [29], where he notices that “The best of our
public officials don’t seek their positions for the money. There are other and infinitely greater
rewards... There is his own respect to win and keep,... while devoting himself faithfully
to the welfare of his country.” This laudation should be viewed with some skepticism in
the light of e.g. the amount of funds embezzled by President Suharto.10 Nevertheless, for
many politicians who would otherwise be able to earn more in the free market, one of the
main incentives for being a politician could indeed come from hoping to achieve something
good. As an additional interpretation one could thus think of the amount redistributed as an
investment into a public good that everyone receives, including the politician.
The probability that the politician is re-elected is depending on the amount of trust Tt
that his voters have in him. The more trust the voters have in the politician the higher his
probability of staying in office. We assume the politician may stay in office forever, unless he
is not re-elected.11 For simplicity, we suggest that if the politician is not re-elected, then his
welfare drops to zero from then on. He will not have the chance to be re-elected. A politician
earns his voters’ trust depending on the amount of taxes that he re-distributes and loses trust
whenever he takes bribes. For our purpose it is sufficient to study a partial equilibrium case.
We, therefore, simply assume that bribe supply, by voters or special interest groups, exceeds
bribe demand for any level of bribes.
Assumption 4 The felicity function u : R2+ → R+ is at least twice continuously differentiable
with u(Zt, Rt) ≥ 0, uZ > 0, uZZ < 0, uR > 0, uRR < 0, uZR = 0. Furthermore, limZ→0 uZ =
∞ and limR→0 uR =∞.
10Gorodnichenko and Peter [35] demonstrate that Ukrainian politicians have the same level of consumption
expenditure and asset holdings as their private sector counterparts despite wage income that is around 40%
lower. They attribute this difference to bribe taking.
11For example, half of the US states do not impose a term limit on their governors (see Besley and Case
[13]). Others, like Hugo Chavez, manage to change the law in order to stay empowered.
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We constrain the felicity function to have a positive domain for reasons forwarded in Schu-
macher [50]. Basically, in models of endogenous discounting one loses the property of ordi-
nality. Meaningful results then require a positive felicity function.
We now characterize the control problem. The politician solves the control problem under
uncertainty
U(T0) = max{Bt,Rt}
E0
{∫ τ
0
u(Zt, Rt)dt
}
(1)
subject to
Zt = Bt + Y +X −Rt, (2)
T˙t = G(Rt −X)− F (Bt)− δTt (3)
As we assume that the politician uses a Poisson function to describe the evolution of uncer-
tainty (c.f. section 2.2) we can rewrite the expectation as
E0
{∫ τ
0
u(Zt, Rt)dt
}
=
∫ ∞
0
u(Zt, Rt)e
− ∫ t0 psdsdt.
We then define ∆t =
∫ t
0 psds, which implies ∆˙t = pt. We can then rewrite the control problem
from above as one where the politician optimizes under certainty
max
{Bt,Rt}
∫ ∞
0
u(Zt, Rt)e
−∆tdt (4)
subject to
Zt = Bt + Y +X −Rt, (5)
T˙t = G(Rt −X)− F (Bt)− δTt, (6)
∆˙t = p(Tt) (7)
with Tt ≥ 0, Bt, Rt ≥ 0, ∀t, and T0 > 0, X > 0 and Y > 0 given.12 An admissible path is
12The fact that the time horizon now runs up to infinity is a result of the transformation to the certainty
case. From an analytical perspective it promises an easier handling of the control problem.
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defined as a trajectory {Zt, Bt, Rt, Tt,∆t}0≤t≤∞ which meets the constraints (5), (6) and (7)
with the states Tt and ∆t being continuous and the controls Bt and Rt piecewise continuous. A
path {Z∗t , B∗t , R∗t , T ∗t ,∆∗t , t} is an optimal path if it is admissible and ∀{Zt, Bt, Rt, Tt,∆t, t ≥ 0}
admissible paths we have
∫∞
0 e
−∆tu(Z∗t , R∗t )dt ≥
∫∞
0 e
−∆tu(Zt, Rt)dt. We now characterize
optimal paths.
3.1 Necessary conditions
The Hamiltonian of this control problem is given by
H(Bt, Rt,∆t, Tt, λt, µt) = u(Bt +Y +X−Rt, Rt)e−∆t −µtp(Tt) +λt
(
G(Rt−X)−F (Bt)− δTt
)
. (8)
Where possible we neglect time subscripts from now on. In order to incorporate the possibility
of corner solutions we introduce the Langrangian, given by
L = H+ φBB + φRR. (9)
The first order conditions are given by
uZe
−∆ = λFB − φB, (10)
uZe
−∆ = λGR + uRe−∆ + φR, (11)
λ˙ = µpT + δλ, (12)
µ˙ = −ue∆. (13)
Lemma 1 On the optimal path, a boundary solution in Bt or Rt is impossible.
Proof 1 Assume R = 0 and B > 0. From equations (10) and (11) we then obtain uZe
−∆ −
uRe
−∆ = uZe−∆GRFB + φR. This is equivalent to
uZ − uR
uZ
>
GR
FB
. (14)
Since uZ is bounded below for R = 0 but uR is unbounded, then this implies that (14) cannot
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hold. Therefore, the combination R = 0 and B > 0 is impossible. For B = 0 and R > 0
we obtain the same condition as above, with the difference that uZ is bounded for B = 0 and
uR <∞ for R > 0. This implies GRFB < 1−
uR
uZ
. However, since FB(0) = 0, then this leads to
a contradiction. We can thus rule out corner solutions.
Assuming that an optimal path exists, which we prove below, we now know that a politician
will always resort to a positive amount of re-distribution and bribe-taking. Though this may
seem surprising, it is supported by e.g. the result in Caselli and Morelli [19], who show how
self-selection of candidates may lead to bad politicians in office. By combining equations (10)
and (11) we obtain
GR
FB
= 1− uR
uZ
. (15)
The right-hand side is always less than one, implying GR < FB. Since both GR > 0 and
FB > 0, then uR/uZ ∈ (0, 1). To anticipate a later result, a steady state in T requires R > Rˆ,
such that redistribution is able to at least offset the depreciation in trust over time. In any
case, we obtain GR < FB and uR < uZ on the optimal path.
To give some intuition to condition (15), let us start with a special case by assuming that
the politician has a negligible social incentive for re-distribution (e.g. in countries with low
levels of social capital), implying uR = 0.
13 In this case the marginal rate of substitution
between bribe-taking and tax re-distribution is equal to one. The politician values both
thus equally, and giving up one unit of bribes would have the same impact on his utility
as re-distributing one more unit of taxes. Thus, in this case the optimal mix between Rt
and Bt rests solely on how both influence trust, and consequently the probability of staying
in office. Then GR = FB, where GR is the marginal benefit (per unit of marginal felicity
from net income) of increases in trust from re-distributing more taxes back to the citizens
while FB reflects the marginal cost (per unit of marginal felicity from net income) due to
decreasing trust from taking more bribes. Thus, optimality requires that the marginal cost
of re-distribution should be equal to the marginal benefit of taking more bribes.
13Strictly speaking, Lemma 1 does not apply in this case. However, based on a similar proof we can conclude
that only interior solutions are optimal even if uR = 0.
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Allowing for uR > 0, then GR < FB since a larger re-distribution now adds to utility via
the additional impact from the social incentives for re-distribution. Importantly, the choice
between re-distribution and bribe-taking is a static efficiency one. As we shall see, changes in
re-distribution and bribe-taking over time will depend on the level of trust, which affects the
probability of staying in office. The optimal mix between the two depends, however, solely
on their marginal contributions to utility and the way in which they impact trust, which is
both independent of time and the level of trust.14
We now present several analytical results that we need on the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2 The optimized Hamiltonian H∗t = 0, ∀t.
Proof 2 We differentiate the optimized Hamiltonian with respect to t.
dH∗
dt
=
(
uZ(B˙ − R˙) + uRR˙
)
e−∆ − pue−∆ − µ˙p− µpT T˙ + λ˙T˙ − λ
(
GRR˙− FBB˙ − δT˙
)
+
∂H∗
∂t
.
Substituting the first-order conditions we derive dH
∗
dt =
∂H∗
∂t . We make use of Michel’s [44]
transversality condition, which states that an optimal path necessarily requires that the Hamil-
tonian goes to zero when time goes to infinity. Mathematically, it requires
lim
t→∞Ht = 0. (16)
Since our Hamiltonian is autonomous, this implies that the optimized Hamiltonian is equal
to zero, at any t, such that H∗t = 0, ∀t. 
Using the result of this Lemma, we obtain the value of µ on the optimal path, which is given
by
µ =
ue−∆ + λT˙
p(T )
> 0. (17)
14This result obtains since the current level of trust only impacts the evolution of trust through the depre-
ciation. One could, however, very well imagine a more general functional form, like T˙t = ϑ(Bt, Rt, Tt), which
would allow for trade-offs at the cost of the current level of tractability.
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By integrating µ forward (based on eq. (13)), we find that it represents the prospective,
discounted value of staying in office. This is given by
µt =
∫ ∞
t
u(Bτ + Y +X −Rτ , Rτ )e−∆τdτ. (18)
This result is valid as long as limt→∞ µt = 0. In a similar manner we derive the value of λt,
which is given by
λt = −eδt
∫ ∞
t
pTτ e
−δτ
∫ ∞
τ
u(Zs, Rs)e
−∆sdsdτ > 0. (19)
Conclusively, λt is the net present (in terms of trust depreciation) value of the Volterra
derivative (with respect to Tt) of the felicity functional integrated over the time τ ∈ [t,∞).
In other words, the shadow value of trust represents the discounted change in the maximand
along the optimal path if the constraint on trust is relaxed by one unit.
3.2 Sufficient condition
To show sufficiency, we need to show that the Hamiltonian is concave in the state variables.
Unfortunately, the original Hamiltonian is, according to either the Mangasarian sufficiency
condition or the Arrow and Kurz sufficiency condition, not concave. We, however, can trans-
form the Hamiltonian and show that the transformed Hamiltonian (that leads to the same
dynamic system as the original Hamiltonian) is concave according to the Arrow and Kurz
sufficiency conditions. This method follows Nairay [45].
Proposition 1 The necessary conditions (10) to (13) together with the transversality condi-
tion (16) are sufficient if Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Proof 3 To prove this, we reduce the dynamic system to one containing only one state
equation. We transform the Hamiltonian by using d∆t/dt = p(Tt), which is equivalent to
d∆t/p(Tt) = dt. This is possible since ∆t ∈ [0,∞) and a monotonic function. We substitute
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this into the control problem (4) and derive a new Hamiltonian
Kt = u(Zt, Rt)e
−∆t
p(Tt)
+ λ
G(Rt −X)− F (Bt)− δTt
p(Tt)
, (20)
with controls Bt, Rt and the single state Tt. The first-order conditions of this Hamiltonian
(with respect to Bt, Rt and Tt) lead to the same dynamic system as that of the original
Hamiltonian (8). We then substitute the first-order conditions back into (20) and derive the
Arrow and Kurz second-order sufficiency condition of the Hamiltonian Kt along the optimal
path. This is given by
∂2K∗
∂T 2
=
(
2
p2T
p2
− pTT
p
)(
u(Z∗)e−∆ + λT˙ ∗
p
)
+ δλ
pT
p2
.
A sufficient condition for ∂
2K∗
∂T 2
< 0 is 2pTp >
pTT
pT
. This holds under Assumption 3.
We, furthermore, need the condition
∫∞
0
e−∆u(Zt,Rt)
p(T ) d∆ < ∞ in order for the utility
functional to converge. Clearly, Rt is bounded by Bt + Y + X. Thus, for any Bt < ∞,
u(0, Bt + Y + X) is bounded and it suffices to know that p(Tt) > pˆ for any Tt in order for
u(0, Bt+Y +X)/p(Tt) to be bounded. We, thus, need an assumption on how u(Zt, Rt)/p(Tt)
behaves for Bt → ∞. Hence, we assume that limB→∞ u(Zt, Rt)/p(Tt) < ∞. Clearly, if
Bt → ∞ then Tt → 0. If the felicity function then tends more slowly to infinity than the
probability to be relieved from office tends to infinity, then this insures the convergence of
the utility functional.15
3.3 The dynamics
Using equation (15) we derive that changes in Bt lead to optimal changes in Rt according to
dR
dB
=
(uZ − uR)FBBFB + uR
uZZ
uZ
(uZ − uR)GRRGR + uRR + uR
uZZ
uZ
≡ ψ(R,B). (21)
15Clearly, it is reasonable to assume that there exists an upper bound on Bt which is large enough in order
to not affect the interior solutions but less than infinity so that the convergence of the utility functional is
always assured.
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We dub function ψ(R,B) the ‘trade-off function’. It shows how a politician trades-off tax-
redistribution and bribe-taking along the optimal path. Assuming no social motive for re-
distribution (uR = 0) implies
dR
dB =
FBB
GRR
< 0. In this case increases in bribe-taking on
the optimal path should lead to reductions in re-distribution. This arises since the optimal
choice between re-distribution and bribe-taking is a static efficiency one, where the increase
in marginal benefit (per unit of marginal felicity from net income) from higher bribe-taking
needs to be offset by an increase in the marginal cost (per unit of marginal felicity from net
income) from re-distribution. The latter is achieved by reducing re-distribution.
Allowing for uR > 0, then along the optimal path we thus have
dR
dB > 0 if−FBBFB
(uZ−uR)uZ
uZZ
<
uR, implying that redistribution and bribe-taking are complements along the optimal path
if the social motive for re-distribution is sufficiently strong. Otherwise, bribe-taking and re-
distribution are substitutes. If both are complements then this implies that the politician, at
least partly, increases bribe-taking because this allows him to increase his efforts towards his
social motives.
An important result for later derivations is stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 3 Given optimal allocations of R and B, then the trade-off function is always smaller
than one, ψ(R,B) < 1.
Proof 4 We use the result in equation (21). From this we obtain, after simplification, that
1− ψ =
(uZ − uR)
(
GRR
GR
− FBBFB
)
+ uRR
uRR + uR
uZZ
uZ
+ (uZ − uR)GRRGR
> 0.
Thus, ψ < 1.
Thus, a one unit increase in bribes along the optimal path leads to a less than one unit change
in re-distribution.
Based on equation (15) we derive that both variables optimally co-evolve over time ac-
cording to
R˙ = ψ(R,B)B˙. (22)
We now solve for the optimal dynamic path of the control variables. We differentiate equation
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(10) with respect to time, then substitute (12), (13), (17) as well as (22) to get the system
that describes the optimal path of the variables
B˙ =
p(T ) + δ + pTp(T )
(
FB
u
uZ
+G(R−X)− F (B)− δT
)
uZZ
uZ
(1− ψ(R,B))− FBBFB
, (23)
R˙ = ψ(R,B)B˙, (24)
T˙ = G(R−X)− F (B)− δT. (25)
We re-write equation (23) with the solution for the shadow value of trust in order to give
some further intuition for the evolution of bribe-taking. This gives
B˙ =
p(T ) + δ + pTµ
uZe−∆
FB
uZZ
uZ
(1− ψ(R,B))− FBBFB
=
p(T ) + δ + pTFB
uZe−∆
∫∞
t u(Zs, Rs)e
−∆sds
uZZ
uZ
(1− ψ(R,B))− FBBFB
, (26)
The denominator is always negative. A faster depreciation in trust has a negative effect on
the evolution of bribe-taking. The faster trust depreciates the quicker will the probability of
being voted out of office increase. In order to compensate for this the politician will reduce
bribe-taking. Since ψ < 1, we furthermore know that re-distribution either decreases less
than bribe-taking or even increases, in case the social incentives outweigh. The direct effect
of a higher probability of being voted out of office is to induce an optimal decrease in bribe-
taking. This direct effect plays the same role as the discount rate in a standard Ramsey-type
economy.
The last term in (26) comes from the endogenous probability of being voted out of office.
A low future expected stream of utility induces an increase in corruption over time. Hence, a
politician from a poor country whose net income Z is small (i.e. someone who neither receives
a large wage Y , nor is able to embezzle many funds) does not take the effect of changes in trust
on the expected stream of utility into account. He will not be sufficiently forward-looking to
care about effects on future expected utility but only be concerned with the current impact
of trust on p(T ), where in his current position the future impact of bribes and re-distribution
on trust is of little importance, and δ.
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The steady state is given by
p(T )
δ + p(T )
pT
= −FB u
uZ
, (27)
T =
1
δ
(
G(R−X)− F (B)), (28)
1− GR
FB
=
uR
uZ
. (29)
These equations define the steady state of the dynamic system. We now provide results on
the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The equations (27), (28) and (29) define a unique equilibrium if Assumption
3 holds.
Proof 5 We substitute T = (G − F )/δ into the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (27) and
define Ω1 = p(
G−F
δ )
δ+p(G−F
δ
)
pT
and Ω2 = −FB uuZ . The derivative with respect to B is
dΩ1
dB
= FB
(
GR
FB
ψ − 1
)(
2p+ δ
δ
− ppTT
δp2T
(δ + p)
)
.
We re-write the terms as follows.
2p+ δ
δ
− ppTT
δp2T
(δ + p) =
p+ δ
δ
(
2− ppTT
p2T
)
− 1 < 0,
by Assumption 3. Also, since ψ < 1 and GR < FB under the interior condition, we find that
the left-hand side increases monotonically in B.
For B → 0, the right-hand side Ω2 of equation (27) is zero. Since u(Z) is bounded
below for B → 0, this implies that uZ is bounded below, and therefore limB→0 Ω2(B) = 0 by
Assumption 2. We calculate
dΩ2
dB
= −FB
[
FBB
FB
u
uZ
+ (1− ψ)
(
u2Z − uuZZ
u2Z
)
+ ψ
uR
uZ
]
< 0.
Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for a crossing is that limT→0 pp+δpT < limB→0−FB uuZ ,
which holds by Assumption 3. In that case we find a unique steady state.
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We now analyze the stability of the dynamic system around its steady state. As we can
express Rt as a contemporaneous function of Bt, we can eliminate one variable and reduce the
dynamic system given by equations (23) to (25) to a system consisting of only two differential
equations. We concentrate on equations (23) and (25), with R = ω(B), where ω(B) is an
implicit function determining the optimal relationship between Rt and Bt that derives from
equation (15).
Proposition 3 The unique steady state of the dynamic system (23) and (25), with R = ω(B),
is saddle-path stable by Assumption 3.
Proof 6 Since R is a multiple of B on the optimal path, then we can reduce the dynamic sys-
tem to a two-dimensional system. By the Implicit Function Theorem we know that equation
(29) can be solved for a unique solution of R as a function of B, given that (uZ − uR)GRRGR +
uRR + uR
uZZ
uZ
6= 0, which holds for any interior solution of R and B. We denote the rela-
tionship between R and B by function R = ω(B), with ω′(B) = ψ(ω(B), B). Therefore, our
two-dimensional system is given by equations (23) and (25), with R = ω(B).
The Jacobian at the steady state is given by
J =
 δ + p 2pT−pTT
δ+p
pT
(1−ψ)uZZ/uZ−FBB/FB
GRψ − FB −δ
 .
The eigenvalues of a two-dimensional system are given by λ1,2 =
1
2(Tr±
√
Tr− 4Det), where
Tr(J ) and Det(J ) refer to respectively the trace and determinant of the Jacobian. The trace
is given by
Tr(J ) = p(T ), (30)
and the determinant is
Det(J ) = −δ(δ + p)− (GRψ − FB)
2pT − pTT δ+ppT
(1− ψ)uZZ/uZ − FBB/FB < 0, (31)
by Assumption 3, the fact that ψ < 1 and GR < FB for an interior solution. 
Conclusively, this result allows us to proceed with a comparative static analysis.
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4 Comparative statics
We derive several steady state comparative statics now. We focus on changes in the politician’s
wage income and taxes received, as well as social capital and electoral accountability. In all
cases we relate the theoretical results to those obtained in the empirical literature.
4.1 Income and taxes
Proposition 4 Steady state bribe-taking decreases with increases in the politician’s wage in-
come, while redistribution decreases if ψ > 0 and increases otherwise. Increases in wages
always increase trust.
Proof 7 We study the steady state equations (27) to (29). We derive
dB
dY
= − 1− uuZZ/u
2
Z(
GR
FB
ψ − 1
)(
p+δ
δ (2− ppTTp2T )− 1
)
+ FBBuFBuZ + (1− ψ)(1− u
uZZ
u2Z
) + ψ uRuZ
< 0.
The denominator is positive by Proof 5. Since we know that dBdR = ψ, and ψ < 1, then the
statement in the proposition follows immediately. Finally,
dT
dY
= (GRψ − FB)dB
dY
> 0.
This holds since GRψ < FB. 
Our model thus predicts that a rise in the politician’s wage income will reduce bribe-taking
while it may increase or decrease his tax re-distribution. Tax re-distribution will decrease if
social incentives are small.
These results support the empirical analysis in Coates [21] who studies whether there is
a correlation between a state’s economic performance and its politician’s pay. The positive
correlation between salary and the quantity of legislation passed suggests that, indeed, a
higher salary provides more incentives for the politician to act in the interests of his voters.
A similar result is obtained when combining results in Di Tella and Fisman (2001), who show
that income per capita is positively related to increases in governors’ wages, and Paldam [48],
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who finds that the transition from poor to rich countries reduces corruption. Both results
together suggest that a higher income per capita leads to a rise in the politician’s wage which
implies a lower level of corruption. Outside of the political world, the same result has been
shown in Di Tella and Schargrodsky [23], who conclude that higher wages improve corruption
problems (if auditing increases, too), echoing results in Becker and Stigler [11]. Finally,
Rijckeghem and Weder [55], Besley [12] and Goel and Rich [34] show that a politician’s pay
and his performance are positively correlated.
A potential caveat to this analysis, and the model in general, is that a politician’s pay
could be conditioned upon past performance. In this case, a better performance of a politician
in the past could have lead to an increased wage. Thus, in the terminology of our model,
e.g. an increase in tax-redistribution Rt in the past could potentially have an impact on a
politician’s salary Y . It is clear that we do not allow for this kind of endogenous feedback in
the model since we assume that a politician’s wage is considered to be exogenous.
Proposition 5 Steady state bribe-taking may increase or decrease with increases in taxes
received, while redistribution moves in the opposite direction if ψ < 0 and in the same direction
otherwise. Changes in trust move in the same direction as changes in bribe-taking.
Proof 8 We study the steady state equations (27) to (29). We derive
dB
dX
= − 1
FB
GR
p+δ
p (2− ppTTp2T ) + FB(1− uuZZ/u
2
Z)(
GR
FB
ψ − 1
)(
p+δ
δ (2− ppTTp2T )− 1
)
+ FBBuFBuZ + (1− ψ)(1− u
uZZ
u2Z
) + ψ uRuZ
.
The denominator is positive by Proof 5. The numerator is positive if −GR p+δp (2 − ppTTp2T ) <
FB(1 − uuZZ/u2Z). Since we know that dBdR = ψ, and ψ < 1, then the statement in the
proposition follows immediately. Finally,
dT
dX
= (GRψ − FB) dB
dX
.
We have that GRψ < FB. Thus, sgn
(
dT
dX
)
= −sgn ( dBdX ). 
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Increases in taxes received have two opposing effects on optimal bribe-taking. On the one
hand, they work as increases to net income and therefore make reductions in bribe-taking more
worthwhile. On the other hand, they change the citizens’ expectations about the amounts
that need to be re-distributed and therefore make the current level of re-distribution less
sufficient. Thus, for a given amount of re-distribution, increases in taxes received induce a
decrease in trust and thereby lead to an increase in the probability of political instability. If
the income effect outweighs the political instability effect then bribe-taking decreases. This
result is in line with the empirical findings in Fan et al. [27] who show that if governments
receive more taxes then this generally reduces bribery.
4.2 Social capital
Assume now that a politician obtains a larger marginal felicity from his social policy. This is
in line with the results in Banfield (1958), Putnam (1993), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and
Tabellini (2005), namely that social capital can predict government performance. We already
had introduced the additive separability of the felicity function in Zt and Rt in Assumption 4.
Thus, without any loss of generality, we take it that u(Z,R) = u˜(Z)+φv˜(R), such that φ > 0
represents the extent of social capital in society.16 For φ = 0 social incentives do not influence
a politician’s choices, while for φ > 0 a politician’s optimal decisions are affected by his social
preferences. Furthermore, the larger is φ, the more important becomes a politician’s social
incentives for tax-redistribution, v˜(R), relative to his personal incentives for simply gaining
felicity from his own net income.
Proposition 6 Steady state bribe-taking decreases with higher social capital, whereas redis-
tribution increases if ψ < 0, otherwise it decreases. Trust increases with higher social capital.
Proof 9 We obtain comparative statics with respect to φ
dB
dφ
= − v˜(R)/u˜Z(
GR
FB
ψ − 1
)(
p+δ
δ (2− ppTTp2T )− 1
)
+ FBBu(Z,R)FB u˜Z + (1− ψ)(1− u(Z,R)
u˜ZZ
u˜2Z
) + ψ v˜Ru˜Z
< 0.
16A similar modeling approach for social capital is used in Glaeser et al. [33].
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The denominator is positive by Proof 5. Since dBdR = ψ and ψ < 1, then the result follows
directly. Finally,
dT
dφ
= (GRψ − FB)dB
dφ
> 0.
This holds since GRψ < FB. 
This, therefore, presents theoretical support of the empirical literature on the relationship
between social capital and governmental performance. A stronger preference towards social
redistribution will induce politicians to increase the money that they redistribute to the agents
and it will reduce their bribe-taking. They thus obtain a higher level of trust in society and
this in turn reduces political stability. This is also in line with the results in Fisman and
Miguel [30], who show that diplomats from countries with stronger social norms (or higher
social capital) accumulate fewer unpaid parking tickets.
4.3 Electoral accountability
An important result in the empirical literature concerns the relationship between democracy
and electoral accountability. Among others, Ferejohn [28] and Chowdhury [20] have shown
that democracy has a significant impact on corruption through electoral accountability. We
can analyze this via comparative statics on the probability of being re-elected. If the voters’
trust does not significantly affect the probability of being re-elected, then one would believe
that bribe-taking increases while redistribution decreases.
Mathematically speaking, we want a steeper slope of p when T changes. At the same
time, we want to keep p for that particular level of T constant. This allows us to isolate the
pure comparative static effect of a change in electoral accountability. We thus re-define the
probability p(T ) of being voted out of office as follows.
Assumption 5 We assume that p(T ) = y(β, βT ), with y1 > 0, y2 < 0 and y22T < −y21.
Conditions y1 > 0 and y2 < 0 are required to keep the level constant while changing the slope,
while condition y22T < −y21 implies that the slope of pT becomes more negative. We then
assume that if β, the proxy for electoral accountability, changes, then dy = {y1 +Ty2}dβ = 0.
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Thus, changes in β keep the level constant, allowing us to isolate the comparative static effect
of electoral accountability. Figure 4 gives a graphical illustration of this.
> Figure 1 approximately here <
Proposition 7 Improvements in electoral accountability induce a decrease in bribe-taking,
an increase in redistribution if ψ < 0 and a decrease otherwise. Steady state trust increases
with improvements in electoral accountability.
Proof 10 We obtain
dB
dβ
=
1
FB
y δ+yβy2
(
1
β +
y22T+y21
y2
)
(
GR
FB
ψ − 1
)(
p+δ
δ (2− ppTTp2T )− 1
)
+ FBBuFBuZ + (1− ψ)(1− u
uZZ
u2Z
) + ψ uRuZ
.
We already know that the denominator is positive. The numerator is negative if
−β y22T + y21
y2
< 1.
This holds by Assumption 5. The arguments regarding the effect on R and T follow from the
proofs above. 
Conclusively, a politician will reduce equilibrium trust if he knows that his probability of being
re-elected is less dependent on trust. This is exactly the mechanism that many politicians
use in order to increase their probability of staying in office. When, for example, Berlusconi
noticed that his voters’ trust decreased since he was pursued for corruption affairs, he simply
implemented a law that gave him immunity from prosecution while in office. Other politicians
take up even more drastic methods. When Robert Mugabe tied with Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe’s
national election of 2008 in the first round, his party used violence and intimidation to win the
elections with over 85% in the second round. Therefore, trust might influence the probability
of being re-elected, but not if other means may impact that probability, too.
In that respect, our model may also apply to the relationship between media and infor-
mational problems in elections. For example, Djankov et al. [24] find a significant correlation
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between media ownership and election outcomes. Similarly, Stro¨mberg [51] shows how the
media can affect the re-distribution of taxes (through the New Deal stimulus), while Brunetti
and Weder [17] conclude that a free press may reduce corruption. Finally Goel and Rich [34]
find that the probability of being convicted reduces the acceptance of bribes.17
5 Conclusion
In this article we have shown how a politician might trade off corruption and tax embezzlement
when trying to maximize his income but at the same time knowing that higher corruption
reduces the trust his citizens have in him and thereby affect his future probability of re-
election. We have shown that politicians may view their bribe-taking and tax embezzlement
as substitutes, but only if they have weak social incentives for good policy. Clearly, we do not
want to neglect the possibility that politicians have social incentives when taking office. In this
case, politicians with strong social motives would view bribe-taking and good re-distributive
policies (that means little tax embezzlement) as complements. This may occur in an arguably
less realistic case, namely if politicians intend to increase their bribe-taking in order to be
able to improve their tax re-distribution.
We found that a higher politician’s income lowers his incentives for being corrupt and
increases his citizens’ steady state trust. This finding is also supported in Billger and Goel
[14], who empirically show that richer countries have lower levels of corruption. Our analytical
model presents a possible causal channel for their empirical claim. Our further results showed
that stronger social capital leads to lower corruption levels. This is in line with the empirical
results in Putnam [49], La Porta et al. [40], Fukuyama [31], Alesina and Glaeser [3], Algan
and Cahuc [7] as well as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales [37], [38]. Our last result was that a
better electoral accountability decreases corruption. This result reveals a possible theoretical
link between media and informational problems in elections. This has been shown empirically
in Djankov et al. [24] or Brunetti and Weder [17], who notice a correlation between media
ownership and election outcomes. Stro¨mberg [51] shows how the media can affect the re-
17This is also consistent with the result in Corman and Mocan [22], Fisman and Miguel [30] and Levitt [41]
that law enforecement reduces crime rates.
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distribution of taxes. These results are similar to those in Ferejohn [28], Billger and Goel [14]
or Chowdhury [20], who have shown that democracy has an impact on corruption through
electoral accountability.
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6 Appendix
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
confidence 0.425 (0.494) 0 1 43,893
corrupt 0.673 (0.469) 0 1 43,893
social 0.26 (0.438) 0 1 43,893
helpful 0.264 (0.441) 0 1 43,893
savings 0.704 (0.457) 0 1 43,893
finasatis 0.425 (0.494) 0 1 43,893
edu2 0.136 (0.343) 0 1 43,893
edu3 0.088 (0.283) 0 1 43,893
edu4 0.216 (0.411) 0 1 43,893
edu5 0.094 (0.291) 0 1 43,893
edu6 0.157 (0.364) 0 1 43,893
edu7 0.074 (0.261) 0 1 43,893
edu8 0.166 (0.372) 0 1 43,893
discuss 0.742 (0.438) 0 1 43,893
party member 0.181 (0.385) 0 1 43,893
sex 0.507 (0.5) 0 1 43,893
age 41.156 (15.729) 15 93 43,893
marital 0.664 (0.472) 0 1 43,893
religious 0.359 (0.48) 0 1 43,893
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Table 2: Determinants of trust in politicians
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES confidence confidence confidence confidence
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit
corrupt -0.0419* -0.111*** -0.0464** -0.110***
(0.0240) (0.0142) (0.0218) (0.0139)
social 0.241*** 0.230*** 0.234*** 0.226***
(0.0266) (0.0237) (0.0250) (0.0237)
helpful 0.0975*** 0.114*** 0.0926*** 0.111***
(0.0240) (0.0158) (0.0230) (0.0152)
savings 0.0383*** 0.0224*** 0.0417*** 0.0224***
(0.0145) (0.00706) (0.0131) (0.00705)
finasatis -0.0100 0.0386** -0.0128 0.0435***
(0.0170) (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0139)
edu2 -0.0486** -0.0232
(0.0204) (0.0169)
edu3 -0.0901*** -0.0549**
(0.0316) (0.0215)
edu4 -0.0681** -0.0725***
(0.0288) (0.0186)
edu5 -0.0740** -0.0721***
(0.0306) (0.0176)
edu6 -0.0390 -0.0664***
(0.0341) (0.0222)
edu7 -0.105*** -0.0669***
(0.0312) (0.0201)
edu8 -0.0752** -0.0870***
(0.0296) (0.0219)
discuss 0.0117 0.0210**
(0.0151) (0.00828)
party member 0.0517** 0.0459***
(0.0235) (0.0111)
sex -0.0145* -0.00614
(0.00857) (0.00701)
age -5.41e-05 0.000783*
(0.000627) (0.000452)
marital 0.0247*** 0.00817
(0.00846) (0.00721)
religious 0.0489** 0.0278**
(0.0223) (0.0124)
Country dummies no yes no yes
Stand. Err. cluster cluster cluster cluster
Observations 43,893 43,893 43,893 43,893
Wald 184.72 341.83
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.12 0.056 0.13
mean VIF 1.77 1.31 2.45 2.19
correctly classified 64.12% 67.75% 64.31% 68.09%
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Trust in Politicians versus Corruption
Figure 2: Control of Corruption versus Political Stability
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Figure 3: Trust in Politicians versus Political Stability
Figure 4: Change in β while keeping the level of p constant
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